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The programs of the ICDISS
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Revitalizing weak states
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In the words of Francis Fukuyama, "the chief threats to us and to world order come from weak, collapsed, or failed states." In the years to come, weak governments, lagging economies, religious pressure, and youth bulges will
align to bring increased internal conflict. The continued prevalence of troubled
and institutionally weak states opens a new set of challenges not just to state sovereignty and
governance but to international security as territories devoid of effective government control come under the
control of non-state actors. This is why the International Council for Democratic Institutions and State Sovereignty
puts its emphasis on the strengthening of the democratic institutions of weak states as a means to preserve and deepen state sovereignty.
The presence of weak, failed and failing states which are unable to effective exercise state sovereignty
has institutional consequences that impinge on their long-term political and economic prospects.
In revitalizing these states the establishment of open, democratic institutions is a priority;
moving away from closed societies (defined as “governments that lack internal checks on their power”)
and at the same time moving away from social crisis and unrest, and the resulting turbulent scenarios
which drive away capital, investment and the market dynamic itself for a long time.
States will face new pressures to democratize, but unless a democratic institutional framework is first in place
such fragile new democracies will lack the adaptive capacity to survive and develop. It is through democratic institutions that the citizens of a state perceive themselves to be
stakeholders and thus gain a consensus towards the future direction of their nation, this in itself leading to
broader overall democratization and away from the sub-scenarios of international isolation,
impoverishment and the capital flight caused by conflicts and ungovernance.
Those countries that fail to find an economic, political and social direction will be immersed in conflict and will experience reversals.
In some critical nations, economic stagnation, political crisis, and domestic strife (in which social, ethnic and political elements often converge) are leading to deeper institutional weakening with internal decomposition processes resulting in pronounced
statehood crisis in terms of the collapse of authority, escalation of internal conflict, and institutional fragmentation (often territorial as well).
Subsequent state failure and the rogue states resulting from chaos will
mean a lack of enforcement of sovereignty. Here, decentralization will result and should be welcomed
by the international community as an alternative outcome for crisis scenario resolution. When a lack
of sovereign enforcement can not be propped up and a period of lawlessless follows, the vacuum will
be filled by new participants who more often than not will welcome international collaboration towards
consolidating their statehood through the establishment of a program of nation building and democratic
institutions.
Where these governments exercise sole and effective governance over part of the state but not all,
and wish to secede, a negotiated secession is preferable to prolonged conflict since the
resulting new nation can be stabilized within months rather than years,
allowing for stable government, rising standards of living, and a decrease in strife and crime,
and enabling it to
attract internal and external investment and help it meet the U.N.'s Millenium Goals.
It is in this context that the International Council for Democratic Institutions and State Sovereignty
is equally oriented towards result-oriented nation building for new and emerging states.
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Nation building for new and emerging states
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The number of new and independent countries more than doubled since WWII.
In the past twenty years alone, thirty two new nations joined the UN.
This trend will continue as democracy and new directions in governance foster
growth for the self-determination of peoples. It is not a change to be
neither feared nor resisted, but embraced and guided so that these new and
emerging nations may grow to healthily find their place in the world
community; benefitting from the collaboration of developed nations acting
in the healthy self interest of conflict resolution
and strategic policies for international integration.
The next decade will witness many changes in the world, posing risks and opportunities.
It is a world where rules are changing and power is decentralizing. The democratization of
institutions, of public discourse and of communications are leading to the empowerment of
regions who recognize that borders from colonial times or from the Cold War are often
contrary to their cultural and political realities.
The process of recognizing and integrating
these new state sovereigns, and letting them undertake the
construction of their institutions,
prevents war and armed conflict in the developing world; channeling
the political ambitions of would-be state actors away from armed insurgencies
and towards productive efforts in nation building and international collaboration.
Delaying international recognition, conversely,
has the opposite result and often exacerbate conflicts derived from drug-trafficking,
massive emigration, the spreading of political instability, and long term crisis scenarios.
Policies for recognition of state sovereignties are in the interest of both
the international community and a major aspect of any emerging country’s search for sustained growth.
Bringing new and smaller countries into the international framework requires
the fresh thinking of the new century; reassessing the approach to strategic conflict resolution.
Recognition of new states introduce new challenges to global governance but it is often the only realistic approach
to peaceful conflict resolution. Policy which does not match reality will fail which is the alternative
to recognition of de facto stakeholders and the alternative to working with them in a partnership to
develop a framework of democratic institutions to ensure the state sovereignty of this reality.
Institutional consolidation will, in turn, cause democratization to seek root as leaders and people
of new and emerging states find their role in the world.
Succesful new countries will take steps towards accommodating the emerging global rule set of democracy, transparency, and free trade. As they do so, they will need support in the form of recognition and partnerships with international organizations and G8 governments, helping these countries integrate into the “globalized world” along with the most advanced countries. Their economic policies will consolidate; they will develop more vibrant national capitalism; and they will attract long-term investments.
It is to be expected that there may be times, especially in the early and struggling days of the formation of a new nation,
when the state has a less developed sense of human rights and democratic governance.
This is often a direct result of recent conflict, a conflict which the international community
may even have prolonged by withholding recognition of state sovereignty. These formative
periods are typical in the early days of new and emerging states and this is where
the outside world can obtain marked and speedily improvements by working in partnership with the state
to shorten this transitional period and guide the building of a framework of viable state sovereignty in which vibrant democratic institutions can thrive.
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